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I. INTRODUCTION 
In this short Essay, I make two small contributions. First, I sketch a 
modest empirical project for testing the normative desirability of Blair & 
Stout’s mediating hierarch concept as a solution to the team production 
problem. Second, I argue that, depending on the results of that empirical 
project, it may be desirable to allow public corporations, as a matter of 
corporate law, to contract around the shareholder profit maximization 
norm. 
In their influential article, A Team Production Theory of Corporate 
Law,1 Professors Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout explained how corporate 
law might be viewed as an attempt at solving what is known as the team 
production problem.2 At its core, this problem has to do with the oppor-
tunistic behavior that arises when multiple economic actors make in-
vestments—whether of labor, capital, or otherwise—in a business ven-
ture where these investments are said to be “firm specific” because they 
cannot be easily withdrawn and redeployed in other projects.3 The prob-
lem is how to construct a governance regime that will create incentives 
for the various team members to act optimally in light of these firm-
specific investments.4 Ex ante governance tools, like compensation, lead 
to shirking, whereas ex post haggling over the surplus leads to inefficient 
rent-seeking.5 
The solution that Blair and Stout focused on in their article is the 
independent third party who is given control over the firm and is in 
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charge of allocating profits to the various members of the team commen-
surate with their individual and team efforts.6 Blair and Stout argue in 
their article that corporate law may be understood as creating such a 
“mediating hierarch” in the board of directors, at least with respect to 
public corporations, where board independence from corporate stake-
holders is more likely because of the dispersed shareholder base.7 This 
theory has at least two obvious implications for corporate law as it ap-
plies to public corporations. The first is that a board of directors, particu-
larly one that is independent from other stakeholders, should have deci-
sionmaking authority. The second is that, in exercising this decisionmak-
ing authority, the board should have the flexibility to take into account 
the interests of the various members of the team, not just the sharehold-
ers. 
The value of any theory can be measured along both descriptive 
and normative dimensions. How does the mediating hierarch theory fare 
as a descriptive and normative matter? As a descriptive theory, the model 
produces mixed results. To be sure, the model does a good job of de-
scribing how the law allocates decisionmaking authority in the corpora-
tion. The theory says that one should expect the board to get this authori-
ty, and the law reflects that expectation.8 Of course, the mediating hierar-
chy theory requires more than just authority located in the board. It also 
requires board independence. But boards of public corporations are 
largely independent as a result of stock exchange rules,9 although it is 
important to emphasize that this independence requirement makes the 
theory less applicable to private corporations that lack an independent 
board.10 Thus, at the very least, the theory appears to be a fairly accurate 
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description of how corporate law allocates decisionmaking authority in 
the public corporation. 
However, the theory is less successful in describing the criterion 
that public company boards are to use in exercising this decisionmaking 
authority. Blair & Stout’s answer is that the board is to mediate among 
the interests of the various stakeholders who have made firm-specific 
investments.11 This, after all, is the nature of the deal that these stake-
holders struck in their solution to the team production problem. They 
agreed to relinquish control over firm assets to a mediating hierarch, who 
would then allocate profits in an efficient manner, commensurate with 
the effort of the various input factors. The problem, however, is that cor-
porate law generally does not reflect a stakeholder profit maximization 
norm. A brief perusal of Delaware court opinions reinforces the fact that 
a board’s goal is to maximize shareholder profit, not that of any other 
stakeholder.12 
To be sure, some argue that this shareholder profit maximization 
norm is irrelevant because it is effectively unenforced as a result of the 
business judgment rule.13 So, in a sense, the debate over the mediating 
hierarch’s success as a descriptive theory is really a debate about the 
power of unenforced norms.14 
Without weighing into this debate at a more general level, my sense 
is that those who argue in the corporate context that the norm imposes a 
real constraint have the better of the argument. First, although the norm 
is not enforced by judicial intervention, it is operationalized through eq-
uity-based compensation, which probably has a greater incentive effect 
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492 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 38:489 
than the threat of judicial review anyway.15 Second, the shareholder prof-
it maximization norm is subject to constant reinforcement, particularly in 
public companies, when boards hire lawyers to advise them as to their 
duties. Norms are not particularly meaningful if there is no mechanism 
for transmitting the norms to the relevant community of actors. However, 
the corporate law norms created by the Delaware courts have a very effi-
cient and effective mechanism of transmission: the members of the cor-
porate bars of New York and Delaware.16 Third, the market for corporate 
control does a good job of restricting boards to focusing on maximizing 
shareholder value.17 Finally, it appears that as an empirical matter, boards 
are complying with the shareholder profit maximization norm, regardless 
of whether the norm is subject to judicial enforcement. One of the domi-
nant narratives of the recent financial crisis is that bank executives took 
excessive risks because they focused too much on maximizing share-
holder profits.18 Whether it is because of the structure of compensation, 
norm reinforcement, or the fear of a hostile takeover, executives of pub-
lic corporations appear to focus on maximizing shareholder profit. 
For all of these reasons, I think it is fair to say that the shareholder 
profit maximization norm is not simply a toothless norm in U.S. corpo-
rate law, but is one that affects actual corporate behavior. Consequently, 
it seems that the mediating hierarch theory is not particularly successful 
as a descriptive theory. It gets the question about the means of corporate 
law—the “who decides” question—right. But its response to the question 
about the ends of corporate law—the “how do they decide” question—is 
almost certainly incorrect. 
Nevertheless, Blair & Stout’s mediating hierarch may still be valu-
able as a normative theory. It seems likely that at least some firms may 
find the optimal solution to the team production problem to be an inde-
pendent board, combined with a firm-wide or stakeholder profit maximi-
zation norm. Indeed, this seems likely to be the case where there are sig-
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nificant trade-offs among stakeholders, for example, in the banking con-
text. 
II. THE TEST 
How might one test the normative desirability of Blair & Stout’s 
solution for the team production problem? One approach would be to 
consider how often private parties select this particular governance pack-
age—an independent board combined with a firm-wide profit maximiza-
tion norm—when forming an entity. The problem of course is that Dela-
ware law does not allow corporations to contract around the profit max-
imization norm. It does, however, grant LLCs this flexibility.19 Thus, one 
way of assessing the normative desirability of Blair & Stout’s mediating 
hierarch solution would be to consider the frequency with which promot-
ers of public LLCs select this particular governance package.20 
This type of project would offer some insight into the normative 
desirability of the board as a mediating hierarch. If promoters are select-
ing this governance package only rarely, then that might suggest that 
Blair & Stout’s solution for the team production problem is not as desir-
able as other alternatives in the real world. If, by contrast, promoters are 
selecting the mediating hierarch governance package quite often, then 
that might suggest that Blair & Stout’s solution has some real-world pur-
chase. 
To be sure, this research question poses some interpretive difficul-
ties. Just because public LLCs might eliminate fiduciary duties does not, 
in and of itself, mean that they have adopted a mediating hierarch ap-
proach to the team production problem. They could simply be exploiting 
inefficiencies in the market for business entity law in order to engage in 
self-dealing without the risk of liability.21 However, this self-dealing in-
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terpretation might be less likely if the LLC agreements reflect an attempt 
to police self-dealing transactions while at the same time allowing direc-
tors and management the flexibility to take into account the interests of 
stakeholders as a whole. 
For example, Mohsen Manesh has found that roughly half of all 
public LLCs and LPs eliminate fiduciary duties altogether with respect to 
their boards of directors.22 Does that mean that these entities have effec-
tively contracted for a mediating hierarch approach to firm governance? 
Not necessarily. That depends on whether the underlying contracts re-
flect an attempt to reign in self-dealing and other aspects covered by tra-
ditional fiduciary duties while allowing the board to take into account 
stakeholder interests. A clearer example of a mediating hierarch govern-
ance package would be an LLC that retains traditional fiduciary duties 
but explicitly adopts a stakeholder profit maximization norm.23  
The policy payoff of answering this type of research question could 
be significant. After all, if stakeholders are choosing this mediating hier-
arch governance package in the LLC context, maybe that implies that 
stakeholders should have the ability to make the same choice in the cor-
porate context. 
III. POTENTIAL POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
In other words, if stakeholders appear to favor the mediating hier-
arch governance package in the LLC context, perhaps this implies that 
the shareholder profit maximization norm should not be a mandatory rule 
but rather a default rule for corporations. One would think that this might 
be a common policy proposal, given the contractarian approach to corpo-
rate law that is dominant in the literature. Contractarianism tends to favor 
default rules in corporate law, so one would naturally think that it would 
favor the same approach with respect to the criterion that boards should 
apply in exercising their decisionmaking authority. But, surprisingly, 
most contractarians tend to argue against a default approach to the share-
holder profit maximization norm.24 Thus, a proposal to make that norm a 
default rule would be nontrivial. Evidence that private actors in an analo-
gous context contract around shareholder profit maximization with some 
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regularity, as a solution to the team production model, would go some 
way in supporting this policy prescription. 
What about the objections to such a policy prescription? One of the 
more vocal contractarians, Professor Bainbridge, argues in favor of a 
mandatory shareholder profit maximization norm on the basis that, 
among other things, nonshareholder constituencies do not make firm-
specific investments,25 although this claim seems demonstrably false,26 as 
Bainbridge later seems to concede.27 Bainbridge further argues that 
shareholders are not as successful as other stakeholders at obtaining con-
tractual protections, although it is not entirely clear that this claim is true 
either.28 One of the more provocative arguments that Bainbridge makes 
is that allowing boards to take into account interests other than those of 
shareholders might lead to “board misconduct.”29 It is difficult to know 
what to make of this argument, however, for Bainbridge is typically so 
deferential to the board that he is opposed to almost any constraint on the 
board’s autonomy.30 And yet, it appears that in Bainbridge’s model, this 
deference is warranted only when the board is considering what is best 
for shareholders. However, when the board is considering what is best 
for the firm as a whole, extreme mistrust of board action is the order of 
the day.31 
It is not entirely clear what might account for these almost diamet-
rically opposed positions. One suggestion that Bainbridge makes is that 
shareholders lack the political clout that other stakeholders, like labor, 
might enjoy, with the implication being that a stakeholder profit maximi-
zation norm would simply allow for this skewed political influence to 
assert itself.32 However, it is not clear (to me, at least) that this is true as 
an empirical matter. Even if it is empirically accurate, it is not clear to 
me that this is a sufficient justification for opposing a stakeholder profit 
maximization norm. The answer to that question depends on a compari-
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son of the profits associated with the efficient projects that the board 
might forgo under a stakeholder––versus a shareholder––profit maximi-
zation norm, taking into account the rent-seeking costs associated with 
increased political lobbying. That question, however, seems much too 
complicated to dismiss with Bainbridge’s political lobbying argument. 
But just because Bainbridge’s arguments against allowing for a 
stakeholder profit maximization norm are not ultimately persuasive, that 
does not by any means settle the matter. Indeed, the strongest objection 
to making corporate law’s maximand a default rule is that it already more 
or less is because of the existence of LLCs and benefit corporations. 
However, this objection also does not appear particularly forceful 
upon further investigation. It is true that entrepreneurs could adopt a me-
diating hierarch solution to the team production problem through the 
LLC entity form. The problem, however, is that the corporation is still 
favored by a significant margin over the LLC for a publicly traded firm 
because of a combination of custom and tax reasons. In other words, the 
investing public is unfamiliar with the LLC form, and the tax administra-
tive costs of a publicly traded entity subject to partnership tax treatment 
are extremely high.33 Furthermore, the relatively few LLCs that are pub-
licly traded are probably least in need of the mediating hierarch structure 
because they are mostly investment firms, where shareholder wealth 
maximization makes more sense anyway because of the absence of sig-
nificant stakeholder trade-offs. For these reasons, it is not particularly 
satisfying to argue that the LLC can simply serve as the vehicle for creat-
ing a mediating hierarchy to solve the team production problem. 
Nor is the benefit corporation a particularly promising vehicle for 
realizing the potential benefits of the mediating hierarch approach to cor-
poration law. The businesses choosing benefit corporation status are 
those engaging in social enterprise, which typically has some purpose in 
addition to generating profit.34 Consider, however, those businesses that 
wish to maximize long-term firm value without a particular social mis-
sion but that do not believe that a shareholder wealth maximization norm 
is the way to do it. The benefit corporation does not seem to be the best 
alternative for those types of businesses. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, there may still be value in making the corporate 
law maximand a default rule, assuming of course that we think that the 
mediating hierarch solution to the team production problem is normative-
ly desirable. In this short Essay, I have suggested one way that we might 
examine that empirical question—through an analysis of the governance 
packages chosen by public LLCs. There might be other methods of ad-
dressing the same question. The broader point is that this is a question 
worth examining, and the reason it deserves such examination is because 
of Blair & Stout’s excellent work. Few indicators of scholarly impact are 
more compelling than that. 
 
